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Abstract 
 This thesis explores the connection between ethnic diversity and constitutional 
structures on the incidence of civil war. The following paper will bridge the gap between 
existing economic literature on constitutions and the existing work on civil wars. The 
main economic theory behind civil war is a cost-benefit analysis. Costs of civil wars 
include raising an army, supporting the army, economic losses due to conflict, and the 
lives lost in the fighting itself, while the main benefit is the gains of governing. The other 
main economic theory to civil war is game theory, exploring how the two sides engaging 
in civil war react to different situations. This paper uses multiple sources of data in order 
to test whether a relationship exists between ethnic diversity, constitutional structures, 
and civil war. One of the main questions this paper asks is whether political 
representation can offset high ethnic tensions and prevent civil war? Interaction terms 
between ethnic diversity and constitutional structures were used to determine if the two 
variables combine to affect the incidence of civil war. Taking the derivative of the 
interaction terms results can add to the discussion about whether or not a tradeoff exists 
between representation and accountability. The results found that ethnic fragmentation 
significantly increases the incidence of civil war, majoritarian governments decrease civil 
war compared to having a proportional representative system, and could not find any 
significant relationship between ethnic diversity and constitutional structure combining to 
effect civil conflict.  
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I. Introduction 
Iraq in 2017 is a textbook case of instability, divided by sectarian civil war. The 
nation is split into three main ethnic groups: Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, and Kurds. In a 
country that is so ethnically fragmented, a constitution that establishes proportional 
representation might provide greater stability; proportional representation would bring 
the three groups together to deliberate their problems, preventing costly sectarian 
warfare. The reality of the situation in present day Iraq is much different. Due to the 2003 
American overthrow of the Sunni dictator Saddam Hussain, Iraq now has a majoritarian 
constitution. Romano (2014) highlights that while the constitution of Iraq was 
majoritarian, there were many provisions to make the country a decentralized state, 
insuring the rights of minorities. This goal of power sharing never came to be, with the 
Shiites sweeping into power under the new constitution written by the Americans. The 
Kurds and Sunni Arab populations were both brushed off and alienated from the political 
process. The Kurds became even more self-governing, essentially breaking off from Iraq 
completely and forming their own state. As for the Sunnis, many welcomed the rise of 
ISIS as liberation from Shiite oppression. Years of warfare followed along with countless 
deaths and an economy in ruin. Could this violence and destruction have been avoided if 
demographics were considered when drafting the Iraqi constitution? 
Constitutions can be a stabilizing or destabilizing force in a country. The type of 
government that a country choses should represent the nation’s history, culture, and 
demographics. A country that is less ethnically fragmented and less polarized would be 
better off under a majoritarian system since the existing literature suggests that this 
system of government has less corruption and higher economic growth (Persson and 
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Tabellini, 2004). If a country is ethnically diverse and polarized would it be more stable 
under a system of proportional representation? 
A civil war is an intra-state conflict where citizens of the same country kill each 
other. Civil war is an extreme failure of politics. In most cases, the outcome of a war 
could have very well been reached by means other than armed conflict. Mittal and 
Weingast (2010) provide an example of this phenomenon through their analysis of the 
American Civil War. On one end, they stress that the American Civil War was a failure 
of politics since the Constitution stopped being “self-enforcing”. On the other hand, they 
point to the Compromise of 1877 as an example of politics successfully preventing a 
second civil war. The Compromise of 1877 gave the Republicans the Presidency in 
exchange for ending reconstruction and reinstating universal suffrage for white males. By 
abandoning the civil rights gains made in the reconstruction era, the politicians of the 
time successfully prevented a second civil war through deliberation.  
Studying civil wars is extremely important because of their destructive nature. 
Civil wars result in tremendous losses of life, reduce education opportunities for citizens, 
create refugees, and reduce the economy of the affected areas. These side effects of civil 
war were seen in our own country during the American Civil War. Around six-hundred 
thousand American’s died in the Civil War, more so than American WW1 and WWII 
casualties combined. In addition to the large losses of life, the American South was 
crushed economically. In the 21st century, many Southern states still have lower per 
capita incomes than their Northern neighbors. As deadly as America’s Civil War was, it 
is only one conflict on a long list of civil wars. By 2002, 16.5 million people died from 
internal conflict since the conclusion of WWII (Trei, 2002). This number far exceeds the 
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3.3 million who perished in inter-state conflict during the same period. Figure 1 below 
well displays the human cost of civil conlicts from 1946-2012. It is for these reasons that 
the causes of civil wars need to be studied, so the likelihood of their occurrence can be 
diminished and the duration of existing internal conflicts can be reduced.  
Figure 1: Civil Wars from 1946-2012 (image from: https://ourworldindata.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ourworldindata_the-100-deadlist-civil-wars-the-
economist.png) 
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This study will build upon the previous economic literature. Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998) were some of the earliest economists to look at civil war. It is their work that 
established the cost-benefit analysis of civil war. A lot of work has been done on how 
ethnic fragmentation impacts stability and civil war including, Anyanwu (2014), Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998), and Bleney and Dimico (2009). Many economists also examine the 
connection between poverty and civil war, including Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), 
Blattman and Miguel (2010), Holtermann (2012) and Miguel et al. (2004). Miguel uses 
the instrumental variable of rainfall to measure the connection between economic shocks 
and civil conflicts in Africa. The theory behind using rainfall is as follows: lower rainfall 
reduces crop yields, which increases poverty, which in turn lowers the opportunity cost of 
fighting among the rural population. On the constitutional side, my research is guided 
heavily from Persson and Tabellini (2004) where the efficiency of different governmental 
structures is examined. This work was extended in 2009 by Blume et al. In both cases, 
they look at Presidential vs. Parliamentary systems and Majoritarian vs. Proportional 
systems.  
The following paper will seek to bridge the gap between the work done on 
constitutions and work done on civil war. This will be done by testing the relationship 
between constitutions and civil war. I will look at how constitutions interact with ethnic 
fragmentation, natural resources, and colonial heritage to impact the incidence of civil 
wars within the world’s democratic states. Section II will explore the previous literature 
and work done on the subject; section III will state the testable hypotheses of the project; 
section IV will discuss the methodology and data used in this paper; section V will show 
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the results of the study; section VI will provide concluding remarks and suggestions for 
future research.  
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II. Existing Literature: 
The following section will discuss previous works on civil wars and constitutions, 
with a look at institutions in both areas. This section will be broken up by the economic 
theory behind civil war, the causes of civil war, and the effects of constitutions. For the 
constitution section, most of the existing scholarly work examines how constitutions 
impact economic policy. If constitutions can impact economic policy, they can impact 
economic growth or cause increased political rents, i.e. corruption. There has not been a 
lot of research into how constitutions directly impact civil wars, so this paper will be 
filling the gap in the existing literature by connecting constitutions to the incidence of 
civil war.  
Theory on Civil War 
The main economic theory behind civil war is a cost-benefit analysis. The cost of 
a civil war includes raising an army, supporting the army, economic losses due to 
conflict, and the lives lost in the fighting itself. If the cost of raising an army rises, the 
chance of a civil war taking place decreases. Likewise, if the expected economic loss or 
expected loss of life goes up, such as an improvement in technology, the cost of a civil 
war goes up, causing the chance of conflict to fall. Another factor on the cost side is the 
expected duration of the conflict. If the expected duration of conflict decreases, the rebels 
have a greater incentive to peruse conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). 
On the benefit side, there are the spoils of war: the gains from controlling the 
politics of the country. This benefit assumingly goes up when the country has higher 
levels of natural resources, such as oil. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) mention non-
7 
 
economic benefits as well; the desire to settle past grievances can be a large benefit when 
considering engaging in civil conflict. Critical to the cost-benefit analysis of civil war is 
the perceived chance of winning, which can tip the cost-benefit analysis in either 
direction. If for any reason one side has an increased perceived chance of winning, the 
probability of civil war will theoretically rise.  
Rebels have one of two goals: to capture the state or to succeed from it (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 1998). The rebel group will engage in civil war when the benefit of doing 
so outweighs the cost. The cost of civil war on the national level can be high, with the 
conflict wreaking havoc on the nation’s economy. The classic example of this would-be 
Russia after the Communist Revolution and the Civil War that followed. In 1917, the 
gross national income of Russia had fallen by one-fifth compared to 1914, the year WWI 
started, and by 1921 that number fell even more to three-fifths of the original national 
income (Markevich and Harrison, 2009).  
Not all the cost benefit analysis that Collier and Hoeffler (2004) mention is 
economic in nature. In their grievance model, a rebellion occurs when people in a country 
have high levels of “grievance”. Their list of grievances includes ethnic or religious 
hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality. While these 
grievances have a cost-benefit analysis as to whether the group will actually rebel, not all 
of them have to be economic in nature. Strong ethnic or religious hatred alone could tip 
the scale of the cost-benefit, causing a civil war to take place.   
Besley and Persson (2009) use game theory to explore the incidence of civil war. 
In their model, a country is split into two groups, each comprising 50% of the population. 
They assume that time is infinite. One group is the incumbent, while one is the 
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opposition. The incumbent almost always has the comparative advantage because they 
can raise an army using public finances. Power can be transferred either peacefully or 
forcefully. Whoever wins the conflict becomes the new incumbent. The game theory 
behind this model is that every decision by one group depends on the decision of the 
other, with different payouts for each equilibrium. There are three equilibriums that 
Besley and Persson come up with in this game theory matrix. First, neither side employs 
violent resources to a conflict, and peace prevails. Second, there is no insurgency but the 
government raises an army and puts down the opposition. This increases the 
government’s payout while reducing the rebels’ chances. Third, both sides commit 
resources to conflict and a civil war follows. The payout for all the option depends on the 
natural resources of the country which was assessed by both groups prior to making their 
decisions. The process for what determines which game theory matrix is used all start 
with the same steps, the decision by the opposition to mount an insurgency or not, 
followed by the governments response.  
The Besley and Persson (2008) model is relevant to this paper because 
constitutions might be able to change the payout in the game theory matrix. If a country 
is more diverse or rich in resources and choses a proportional representation system, the 
government can essentially buy off parts of the population. Buying off a percentage of 
the population more likely to rebel would increase the payout of the first equilibrium in 
Besley and Persson, in which both sides stay at peace.  
Sometimes the threat of revolution is enough to avoid a civil war. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2000) look at how extending the franchise in the Western world was 
politically motivated to fight off the winds of revolution. The political elites extended 
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voting rights to prevent social unrest and revolution. Extension of the vote essentially 
“bought off” a revolution politically, which to the elites was “cheaper” than engaging in a 
costly civil war. Extending the franchise had real economic effects as well, leading to 
redistributive programs, which in turn reduced inequality in the Western world.  
Evidence on Civil War 
Various economists have differing opinions as to what factors cause civil wars. 
One of the most common subjects explored by economists studying civil war is the ethnic 
composition of a nation. Another common factor studied is income, unemployment and 
poverty. State reach, institutions, natural resources, and the culture and social capital are 
all factors economists have considered when working on civil war. These factors can 
raise or lower the costs or benefits of fighting a civil conflict.  
Ethnic Composition 
An ethnic group is an anthropological term that refers to people who share a 
similar ancestry; an ethnic group’s commonalities often include a shared language, 
culture, religion and ritual. The ethnic composition of a country is the share that each 
ethnic group represents in a state. For example, to use Iraq again, the population is 
roughly 75% Arab, 20% Kurd, and 5% “other”. There are many different dimensions to 
the ethnic composition of a nation. Ethnic fragmentation one way to measure a countries 
ethnic composition, showing the probability that two people, selected at random from a 
state’s population, belong to a different ethnic group. Alternatively, polarization 
measures the degree to which a group feels socially or ideologically separated from 
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others. Lastly, partition measures the percent of the population belonging to an ethnic 
group that spans across neighboring borders.  
Civil wars often organize around ethnic groups for many reasons. Easterly (2001) 
offers the argument that ethnic groups often act in self-interest. An ethnic group is likely 
to gain from a spillover effect from an increase in human capital or knowledge from 
individuals their own group. Ethnic groups are also subject to the tragedy of the 
commons. Each ethnic group within a society has the incentive to over extract a common 
resource, increasing the payout of engaging in civil war. (Easterly, 2001).  
The idea that ethnic, religious and linguistic fragmentation can augment the 
chances of civil war is supported by many economists, including Anyanwu (2014). 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) determine that the ethnic fragmentation is not itself the cause 
of civil war; civil war occurs when ethnic fragmentation causes a country to be polarized 
into two main groups. Therefore, their study looks at polarization of ethnic groups, not 
the ethnic composition of a country itself. Overall, ethnic diversity becomes a problem 
when there is a group accounting for 40-60% of the population which has the power to 
dominate the others. A polarized country has a 50% higher chance of engaging in civil 
conflict than either a homogenous or heterogeneous state (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). 
Bleaney and Dimico (2009) supported Collier and Hoeffler by finding that polarization is 
a significant cause of civil war in nations with low to mid-levels of ethnic diversity. 
However, they disagree with its relevance in nations with high levels of ethnic diversity, 
where the chance of civil war is already higher. An interesting aspect added by 
Cunningham (2013) was that the amount of kin an ethnic group has in neighboring states 
is significant. The reason for this is likely because the people in the neighboring state can 
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help their rebel kin, which effectively lowers the opportunity cost of fighting for the 
rebels. 
Income, unemployment, poverty 
Not all economists agree that ethnic fragmentation increases the propensity for 
civil war. Income, unemployment and poverty, three very closely related terms, are often 
explored by economists as a cause of civil war. The theory behind poverty causing civil 
war is related to the opportunity cost of engaging in fighting; by nature, people with less 
material wealth have less to lose from conflict.  
Holtermann (2012) explains that poverty reduces the opportunity cost of rebelling 
and makes it easier to recruit. His theory is that less developed nations have lower levels 
of state reach; this lower levels of “state reach” allows for rebels to control remote areas; 
this in turn makes persuasion, organization and coercion easier, and increased the 
economic rewards for recruited rebels. His measures of “state reach” included road 
density, telephone density, and urban population. Bleaney and Dimico (2009) and 
Cunningham (2013) both support the theory that poverty can lead to civil war. Bleaney 
and Dimico (2009) use multiple definitions of civil war in their work. Their data sets of 
civil war range from a conflict with 1000 annual deaths to a conflict with only 25 annual 
deaths. All of these measures of civil war use incidence rather than onset. Their measure 
of poverty is real per capita GDP in terms of PPP. Another variable considered by 
Bleaney and Dimico (2009) was the amount of mountainous terrain a country has. This 
can be grouped in with an aspect of “state reach”, with mountainous terrain making it 
harder for the state to defeat a rebel group. Both Bleaney and Dimico (2009) and 
Cunningham (2013) recognize the problem of the endogeneity of poverty. Both attempt 
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to solve this problem the same way, using a time lag. However, even with a time lag, 
poverty can be endogenous, with the regressions unable to determine which came first, 
the poverty or the civil strife.  
The analysis of Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) also runs into the problem of 
reverse causation. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) dispute the belief that ethnic tension is 
the cause of civil war, and blame poverty, failed political institutions, and economic 
dependence of natural resources as the source of Africa’s civil wars. They found that civil 
war is a failure of politics, which indicates that the solutions to civil war are political in 
nature. This supports the theory that constitutions can impact the stability of the country. 
A potential solution for diverse African countries would be a more proportional 
government, where various groups can come together to deliberate the issues the nation 
faces. Blattman and Miguel (2010) address this problem of reverse causation, in which 
the civil war might be causing the poverty and weak government institutions, not the 
other way around as Elbadawi and Sambanis claim. 
Miguel et al. (2004) uses the instrumental variable of rainfall to measure the 
connection between economic shocks and civil conflict in Africa. Rainfall is an 
instrument for poverty since lower amounts of rainfall reduces crop yields. By using 
rainfall as an instrumental variable for poverty, Miguel et al. can eliminate the 
endogeneity of the variable. Reduced crop yields lowers the opportunity cost of fighting 
among the rural population. Lower amounts of rainfall also reduces government revenue 
and lowers the capacities of the states (Miguel et al, 2004). They find that a 5% negative 
economic shock can increase the chance of civil war the next year by one-half. These 
13 
 
findings would suggest that natural resources could play an extremely large role in civil 
conflict.  
Institutions 
One of the most common explanations for the high incidence of civil war is the 
legacy of colonialism. Acemonglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) suggest that European 
mortality impacted institutions; this can have present day implications on economic 
development. Countries where Europeans faced higher mortality rates resulted in 
institutions that were based on extraction. These institutions had long lasting negative 
effects on the country’s economic performance. This theory can help explain why some 
colonies, such as Canada, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand, became more stable and 
successful than others, such as the many colonies in Africa. Their findings are relevant to 
civil war because many economists attribute poverty with the onset of internal conflict. 
This would indicate that any country where European settlers faced higher mortality rates 
has a higher chance of engaging in civil war.  
European imperialism also had long lasting impacts on the world map. Many 
borders around the world were drawn by Europeans without any regard for the people 
living there. For example, 80% of the borders in Africa are based off longitude and 
latitude. Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2006) explore the effects of these “artificial 
borders” in great detail. Their study determines if a state is “artificial” based on two 
different ways: the straightness of their borders, and how borders divided ethnic groups 
between neighboring countries. Their logic behind both is simple, if a country has 
straight borders, it most likely was drawn by an outsider without considering the facts on 
the ground; if two neighboring countries have similar ethnic divisions, the same outside 
14 
 
drawing of borders likely occurred. “Artificial states” directly relate to civil war because 
of the problems artificial borders creates. The problem with an outsider creating borders 
is that they might have given the land to one group while ignoring claims of another. 
Additionally, they could have split ethnic groups into different countries, and/or 
combined multiple ethnic groups in a single country when they would prefer 
independence (Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski, 2006). A civil war is not necessarily 
eminent if the conditions of an “artificial state” occurs. Easterly (2001) suggests that 
good institutions can compensate ethnic divisions. If institutions prevail, Easterly found 
that high levels of ethnic diversity did not lower economic growth.  
Natural Resources 
Oil wealth is also thought to impact the propensity for civil war. Anyanwu (2014) 
explores the connection between oil and civil war in Africa. One of the ways that oil 
wealth can lead to civil war is by increased grievances over the resource. If a country is 
ethnically fragmented, uneven distribution of the oil wealth can lead to anti-government 
complaints. Similarly, the environmental impacts of extracting the oil might 
disproportionately impact one group of people within the country, which increases the 
chance of civil conflict (Anyanwu 2014). Overall, oil wealth can be a blessing or a curse. 
It could lead to a fight over the resource, or provide wealth for an entire people if 
managed and distributed properly. If an oil rich country uses their wealth wisely, they 
might be able to “buy off” a civil war by supporting social programs that the people want. 
This logic is supported in Regan and Frank (2014) where a government can use migrant 
remittances to smooth the nation’s problems and build up its social programs. Reagan and 
Norton (2005) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) both go into detail on how grievances 
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impact the propensity for civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use the standard 
definition of civil war: a minimum of 1000 battle related deaths in one year with 5% 
casualties on each side. In many countries with abundant natural resources, the 
opportunity cost of rebelling is lowered because the benefit of rebelling is higher, i.e. 
gaining the natural resources. They point out exceptions, such as Saudi Arabia, where it 
is so resource rich that the government is too well financed for a rebellion to take place.  
Culture and Social Capital 
Often, a civil war can be proceeded by a sudden revolution. Gorodnichenko and 
Roland (2015) use the term revolution to describe a time when citizens can overcome 
their collective problems and cultures to overthrow the government/regime. A civil war is 
always either a revolution or an attempt of one group to secede from the state. 
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2015) recently discussed how collectivist cultures can 
inhibit a country from adopting democracy post revolution. In this theory, after a country 
undergoes a revolution that overthrows an autocrat, countries with more individualistic 
cultures will be more likely to successfully transition to democracy. The implications of 
these findings are huge for the future transitions of many of the worlds non-democratic 
countries. It is important to look at non-democratic countries as well, because as Persson 
and Tabellini (2004) remind us, very few democratic countries enact constitutional 
reforms. Conventional wisdom would suggest that China will eventually evolve into a 
democracy due to the human want for political participation as the middle class grows; 
oppression of those human rights can even lead to civil war. Gorodnichenko and Roland 
suggest otherwise, predicting that a country like China can advance economically and 
maintain its autocratic style of government because it is a collectivist country. Likewise, 
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their research suggests that individualist countries, such as many of the nations of the 
Middle East, will evolve into successful democracies. This is relevant for this paper 
because a civil war might take place in a Middle Eastern country as a result of the 
combination of high ethnic fragmentation and majoritarian system of government; the 
country might not transition into a successful democracy if it doesn’t chose the correct 
constitution type for the nations’ demographic structure.  
Africa has experienced a disproportionate impact from colonialization due to the 
difference in the extractive nature of colonialism. Kitissou and Yoon (2014) draw a 
thought-provoking connection between the slave trade1, colonialism, and the current 
problem with internal conflicts. It is important to note that Kitissou and Yoon do not use 
an empirical model to test their hypothesis, most likely because of the lack of data dating 
back to the slave trade. Their work is nevertheless extremely interesting to the research 
into the civil wars of Africa because of the continent’s unique past with slavery. The 
common theme throughout periods of African history is a problem with low social capital 
(Kitissou and Yoon, 2014). Slavery decreased Africa’s social capital, which ushered in 
the era of colonialism; European colonialism further reduced the social capital of the 
native population, which in turn led to the post-independence civil wars, lowering the 
social capital of the continent even further, leading to more internal conflicts. Ayers 
(2010) supports the idea that colonialism helped cause civil wars in Africa, using Sudan 
as an example. An interesting addition in Ayers (2010) is that it not only looks at how 
colonialism impacted ethnic fragmentation, but also studies how other global events, such 
                                                          
1 The slave trade can be defined as the period from 650-1900. This started with Arab slavers in 
North Africa and increased under the Atlantic slave trade of 1400-1800s. Historians often end this 
era with nearly universal abolition of slavery by the end of the 19th century.  
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as the cold war and the war on terror, intensify the negative effects of colonialism on civil 
war.  
Constitutions 
 There have been many studies on the economic consequences of constitutional 
structures. The leading scholars in this field are Persson and Tabellini, Acemonglu, and 
Weingast. Persson and Tabellini (2004) look at the effects of having a majoritarian vs 
proportional representation system and the effects of having a presidential vs 
parliamentary system. This work was later expanded on by Blume et. A (2009).  
Majoritarian vs Proportional Representation 
Some of the leading research on constitutions comes from Persson and Tabellini 
(2004). They look at the effects of having a majoritarian vs proportional representation 
system on the economic performance of a country. A proportional system is a type of 
government where divisions in the electorate are reflected proportionally in a governing 
body. For example, in Israel, if one party gets 40% of the nation’s votes, the party will 
receive 40% of the seats in the legislative branch. A majoritarian system is different; it is 
a winner takes all system. Whoever gets the most votes gets the power, with the loser 
receiving nothing even if they received a large percentage of the vote. An example of a 
majoritarian system is the United States, where a person could win an entire seat in 
congress with less than 50% of the vote so long as they receive the most votes. A 
democracy can either be majoritarian presidential, majoritarian parliamentary, 
proportional presidential, or proportional parliamentary. It is important to remember that 
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the rules of each countries’ elections vary, and while they can be categorized as one of 
the four options above, differences still do exist. 
Persson and Tabellini (2004) found a tradeoff between accountability and 
representation. If a system of government is majoritarian, the representatives will be more 
likely to try and please the people who vote for them. This causes lower amounts of 
corruption and therefore higher economic growth. Overall, voting for an individual rather 
than a list is found to reduce corruption by roughly 20%. These results are supported by a 
later study, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007), which explores the efficiency of 
different forms of government. They found that competition among coalition members 
within a single government leads to higher spending. This supports the theory that 
majoritarian systems, which often result in single party rule, are more efficient. Many 
different things impact corruption in their study, including per capita income, openness, 
colonial history, geographical location, etc.  
Blume et al. (2009) expand the data set used by Persson and Tabellini from 85 to 
116 countries and utilize more recent data. They find results that support the previous 
findings about electoral systems, majoritarian versus proportional. 
Presidential vs Parliamentary  
Persson and Tabellini (2004) also look at the effects of having a parliamentary vs 
presidential system on the economic performance of a country. The difference between a 
presidential and parliamentary system is that the prior has executive power, while the 
latter has both executive and legislative power. They find that presidential governments 
have overall lower levels of spending compared to parliamentary systems. Their research 
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found that a country with a presidential system can reduce its government spending and 
have lower debt and deficits, while having lower tax revenue. Government expenditures 
can be 10% of GDP lower in the long run if a nation switched from a parliamentary 
system to a presidential system (Persson and Tabellini, 2004).  
When Blume et al. (2009) expanded on Persson and Tabellini’s work, they did not 
find evidence that presidential regimes provide greater efficiency over parliamentary. 
There are multiple explanations for why they might have found presidential regimes to be 
insignificant whereas Persson and Tabellini found it to have a strong and significant 
effect. Persson and Tabellini might have excluded certain countries that had presidential 
systems because they didn’t meet the freedom and civil liberty criteria, thus creating a 
systematic selection bias. Regardless of which papers results hold true, all of them agree 
that constitutions have strong effects. One thing that Persson and Tabellini fail to 
consider is the ethnic composition of the country. The ethnic composition of a country 
could impact the system of government that a nation chooses, therefore impacting that 
states economic policy, and ultimately their propensity for civil war.  
Constitutions impact on stability and self-enforcing constitutions 
Current decisions can influence the future distribution of political power. For 
example, a decision to extend the franchise in the present impacts who will be in power 
in the future. The people who are in power in the future are the ones who will be setting 
the policy of that time. Therefore, current decisions impact future decisions (Acemoglu et 
al. 2012). Acemoglu et al. argue that the stability of a constitution is not dependent on the 
absence of powerful groups that want an alternative government, but due to the absence 
of a stable alternative by the powerful opposition group. An interesting example comes 
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from comparing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, to a country like Turkey. Iran 
and Saudi Arabia cater to the extreme Islamic elements in their states to allow the 
regimes to remain in power; they are worried that giving secular groups greater rights 
would result in the downfall in their governments. On the other hand, a country like 
Turkey bans state sponsored Islam and historically is worried about the “slippery slope” 
that might occur if the government grants religious parties too many rights. Indeed, one 
can argue that Turkey is already falling down this “slippery slope”, with the right-wing 
government of President Erdogan. The world witnessed the instability of Turkey in July 
2016 when a secularist military coup failed to overthrow what they saw as an 
increasingly Islamic government.  
The findings of Acemonglu et al. (2012) are particularly interesting when 
considering the tradeoff between stability and efficiency. Their findings would suggest 
that a country would forgo efficiency related changes due to the risk that it would 
increase the chances of future instability. This suggests that a state does not need to be in 
Pareto Efficiency. Another option for that state might exist with greater efficiency, but 
will not be stable enough to implement. (Acemoglu et al. 2012).  
Mittal and Weingast (2010) support the theory that constitutions can cause 
stability or instability within a country. They use the example of the American 
Constitution, both pre-civil war and post Compromise of 1877, to examine how and when 
a constitution is “self-enforcing.” Their argument is that the Constitution was “self-
enforcing” before 1860 and again after 1877. Abraham Lincoln was able to win the 
election of 1860 without carrying a single southern state. To Southerners, this signaled a 
breakdown in democracy; they no longer viewed the Constitution as valid, i.e. it was no 
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longer self-enforcing. The result was the American Civil War, the deadliest conflict in 
American history. The war ended in 1865, but the country was far from stable. The 
Republican government of the North imposed their will on the South, in what came to be 
known as the Era of Reconstruction. During this time, there was a real fear of another 
civil war. In order to reduce the chances of another civil war following the questionable 
election results of the 1876 election, a compromise was reached. In the Compromise of 
1877, the Republicans would retain the presidency in exchange for the end of 
reconstruction. As the North withdrew their forces from the South, universal white male 
suffrage was regained in Southern states, and Jim Crow laws were put in place. A second 
civil war was avoided, the Constitution’s “self-enforcing” nature was restored, but at the 
cost of the post-war gains in civil rights. It would be another hundred years before Black 
Southerners would again have the right to vote.  
Another example of a self-enforcing constitution is England following the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688. North and Weingast (1989) explore the link between the 
Glorious Revolution and the economic success that England experienced in the following 
centuries. The goals of the “revolutionaries” was to protect their personal wealth from the 
Crown. Protection of wealth came from increased property rights and limiting 
government confiscations. By securing property rights, the incentive to invest increased 
dramatically, spurring a major increase in the English capital markets. The logic is 
simple; why would a wealthy English landowner invest in government debt if they never 
expected the Sovereign to pay them back? Before the Glorious Revolution, the Crown 
would forgive the debts it had, never paying back the people the King had borrowed 
from. The post-Glorious Revolution institutions insured that there were checks on the 
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Crown, which in turn lead to the expansion of the capital markets. These findings are 
extremely important because it shows that having rights guaranteed in a constitution is 
not enough to effect economic policy. The government must display a commitment to the 
constitutional rights it grants in order to gain from the full effects those institutions have 
to offer. (North and Weingast, 1989).  
Mittal and Weingast’s (2010) findings are interesting, revolving around the idea 
that constitutional stability is determined by the incentives facing elected political 
officials. For a constitution to remain stable, the incumbent who loses must have an 
incentive to step down from office; those out of office must forgo the use of force as a 
means of gaining power. The implication of this conclusion in the subject of constitutions 
and civil war is that constitutional stability revolves around a cost benefit analysis of 
engaging in a civil war. 
Regional and colonial origins of constitutions 
Regional tendencies and colonial origins can play a role in what type of 
constitution a country chooses. According to Persson and Tabellini (2004), South 
America tends to dominated by the presidential system of government, Europe tends to 
have more parliaments and proportional representation, and former British colonies 
mainly have parliamentary systems with single member districts. Persson (2004) points 
out that constitutions are not picked randomly, and depend on the history, culture, and 
geography of a country. This is important because it can cause a selection bias in the data, 
where one system of government might have skewed results due to a common history, 
culture and geography. Regional tendencies can also cause the third variable problem, 
where the country’s ethnic or cultural past might lead it to civil war, as opposed to the 
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type of government they have as a result of colonialization leading the country to civil 
war. A country might run into stability problems if its constitution is based on regional 
tendencies and/or a colonial past, when its demographics would suggest having a 
different form of government.  
Constitutions and institutions  
A constitution sets rules for how a country’s institutions operate. Easterly (2001) 
argues that institutions can be used to solve the problems of ethnic fragmentation. These 
problems can include adverse effects on income, growth, and economic policies. If 
institutions can solve ethnic fragmentation problems and constitutions lead to institutions, 
it is logical to deduce that constitutions can be used to solve ethnic fragmentations.  
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III. Testable Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis this paper will test is whether constitutional structures impact 
the incidence of civil war. This hypothesis (H1) is: if a country has a majoritarian 
government, the incidence of civil war will increase. This hypothesis helps to test the 
trade-off between representation and accountability. If the majoritarian variable is 
positive and significant, representation matters more than accountability when looking at 
civil war. If the majoritarian term is negative and significant, the opposite is true. In that 
case, lack of representation is offset more by the gain of accountability.  
One of the main ideas that this paper will test is whether constitutions can reduce 
the chance of ethnic fragmentation causing civil war. The second hypothesis (H2) is: if a 
country is more ethnically diverse, more polarized, or has higher rates of partitioning, 
then a proportional representation system would reduce the incidence of civil war. 
Proportional representation would allow for all groups within the population to be 
represented in government, where they have a greater chance of solving problems 
through diplomacy, not violence. A proportional system would not allow for a majority to 
exclude minority groups from participating in government. Theory would suggest that 
greater political representation will raise the cost of fighting, while lowering the benefit, 
overall reducing the chance of civil conflict. H1 will be tested through an interaction term 
of ethnic composition * the majoritarian dummy. After the regression is run, the 
derivative of the results will be taken to determine if there is a positive or negative effect 
of constitutions relation to civil war. Other ethnic variables that will be run through 
regressions in the same way include polarization and partition. The interaction of ethnic 
fragmentation and the presidential dummy will also be checked.  
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The third hypothesis (H3) is: if a country with higher levels of natural resource 
reserves has a proportional representation system, then there will be a lower incidence of 
civil war. Previous economic literature shows that proportional representation leads to 
more inefficient government. The representatives use their influence in government to 
direct government resources to the segments of the population that voted for them. A 
resource rich country can “buy off” potential rebels through a proportional system, 
because different groups representatives in government will direct the resource wealth to 
their constituents. An interaction term of natural resource reserves * the majoritarian 
dummy will be used to test this hypothesis. It is expected that the interaction will be 
positive, since the combination of high natural resources and majoritarian government 
will lead to disproportionate sharing of wealth, i.e. increased inequality (greed model).  
The fourth hypothesis (H4) this paper will look at is: if a country with a colonial 
past based on extraction has a majoritarian system, then they will be less likely to 
experience a civil war. Most of the non-European world was a colony at some point in 
history. Some of these colonies turned out to be successful wealthy countries, such as the 
United States, Canada, and Australia, while others became pressure cookers for violence, 
such as Sudan. Previous work suggests that if the European settlers faced high mortality 
rates, the colonial masters set up institutions based on extraction. One way to test for this 
is to use a longitude variable, since the colonies closer to the equator were the colonies 
with higher mortality rates. Another way to test this hypothesis would be to use 
Easterly’s wheat-sugar ratio, which uses the ratio of the land suitable to grow sugar 
versus the land suitable to grow wheat as an instrument for inequality. Controlling for 
ethnic fragmentation and natural resources, a majoritarian system might be better for 
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these post-colonial countries to avoid civil war. A majoritarian system would allow for 
lower political rents and higher economic growth. When the country reduces poverty, it 
would raise the opportunity cost of fighting in a civil war since people have more to lose 
from conflict.  
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IV. Data and Methodology 
Data 
One of the most important decisions with regards to the data is how to measure 
civil war. Miguel (2004) makes the point that defining civil war greatly effects the 
measurement and perception of such conflicts. For example, Figure 2 in the Appendix 
shows how the percentages of countries that are currently in a state of civil war from 
1960 to 2006. The number of civil wars changes greatly if the definition goes from 1000 
annual deaths to 25. Figure 2 in the appendix shows how under 10% of countries had an 
internal conflict in 2006 that had over 1000 deaths, while around 15% had conflicts with 
over 25 deaths. The most common definition of civil war used by other economists’ is 
1000 annual deaths from violence, so that is the definition this paper will use.  
The civil war data was sourced from the University of Michigan’s Correlates of 
War Project (CoW). The intra-state war data is on version 4.1 currently, and was released 
in 2010. The dataset includes all intra-state conflicts with over 1000 total annual battle 
deaths from 1816 to 2007. This data was used to code the CW variable, breaking it into 
decadal data from 1960 to 2000. If a country was engaged in internal conflict for two 
years out of the decade, they would receive a .2 for CW for that time period. The 2000 
decade was more limited since the CoW data stops at 2007. There are 580 observations 
for the CW variable, with a mean of .0314. This means that the average country is 
engaged in civil war for less than one third of a year per decade. The data of the 116 
democracies indicates that most nations are very stable over time, with countries like the 
United States experiencing zero civil war for the entire 50 years of the data. On the other 
side of the spectrum are countries like Nicaragua, which experienced eight years of civil 
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war in the 1980s. There is a wide range of CW across countries, with some having zero 
incidence of civil war, coded in as a 0 for that decade; on the other hand, some countries 
have a civil war that lasts the entire decade, coded as a 1.  
Several limitations exist with using the Correlates of War data that need to be 
noted. First, large number of conflicts are left out due to the 1000 death cut off. The 
Troubles in Ireland, a major conflict for modern Western European history, is not 
included because the U.K. never experienced a single year of over 1000 deaths. Other 
smaller but notable conflicts that are left out include Cyprus, Macedonia, Slovenia. 
Another limitation on using the 1000 death definition of civil war is that it doesn’t always 
account for the length of the conflict. One example of this is Senegal, which had a decade 
plus long civil conflict, yet only one year had over 1000 deaths, resulting in only one 
decade coded as a .1. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the 1000 death definition 
implies that larger countries are more likely to be engaged in civil war. India, with over a 
billion people, often has small rebellions that result in over 1000 deaths annually. This 
results in India being coded in as engaged in civil war for most parts of every decade, 
when in reality 1000 deaths out of a population of over a billion is a relatively small 
number. It is hard to compare the decadal CW data of India to a country like Venezuela. 
Lastly, since the data only goes to 2007, it does not take into account the conflicts that 
have happened since. The ethnic data and constitution data might look as though a civil 
war should have taken place, but the CW variable might remain at zero. This could be 
because the conflict has not happened yet as of 2007. Indeed, this effect is shown in the 
Central African Republic (2012 start), Mali (2012 start) and Ukraine (2014 start). While 
29 
 
many limitations exist, the correlates of war data is still the most commonly used 
scholarly source on civil war, so using it helps maintain consistency across the discipline.  
Both the presidential and majoritarian variables are dummies, coded as either a 0 
or 1. The source of this data was Dr. Voigt, who extended Persson and Tabellini’s work 
from 80 countries to 116, by using a broader definition of the term democracy. For the 
sake of repetition, this paper will use those same 116 democratic countries. The variable 
PRES is a dummy variable showing whether the country has a presidential system of 
government or a parliamentary system. A 1 indicates that the country has a presidential 
system, while a 0 means the country is run by a parliament (and therefore a Prime 
Minister). The variable MAJ is a dummy variable showing the way a government is 
elected. A 1 indicates that the country utilizes a majoritarian system of voting, while a 0 
indicates the country as a proportional representative structure. PRES has a mean of .3, so 
the vast majority (70%) of the 116 countries are on a parliamentary system; A smaller 
majority, 58% of the 116 countries, are on a proportional representation system (MAJ has 
a mean of .42).  
There are three main variables used to measure the ethnic structure within a 
country. The first variable is FRAG, which shows the ethnic fragmentation of the nation. 
Sourced from Easterly, this variable shows the likelihood that two people are in the same 
ethnic group. Some countries are extremely homogenous, scoring a 1 in fragmentation 
such as Japan or Portugal. Likewise, some states are extremely diverse ethnically, such as 
the Central African Republic which scored an 83. The ethnic fragmentation data covers 
71 of the 116 countries used. The range of fragmentation varies from 0 to 90. FRAG has 
a mean of 36.47. An alternative way to measure ethnic diversity within the country is to 
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use polarization. POLAR is the variable that measures the degree to which a group feels 
socially or ideologically separated from others. The data for POLAR came from Jose 
Montalvo’s paper on ethnic polarization, and was generated using data from the World 
Christian Encyclopedia. The POLAR variable is available for the majority of countries, 
resulting in 435 observations. Similar to FRAG, POLAR covers a wide array of 
countries, ranging from .017 to .958. The last measure of ethnic diversity is a 
PARTITION variable, measuring the percentage of the population belonging to a 
partitioned group. This shows how ethnic groups are split across two bordering countries.  
This data was sourced from the 2006 Alesina, A., W. Easterly, and J. Matuszeski paper 
on artificial states. PARTITION also has a wide variation across countries, ranging from 
0 to 99.  
Using multiple variables to measure ethnic diversity is very important; While 
these three variables all measure the ethnic makeup of a country, they all use different 
definitions, and hence result in different findings. Furthermore, the previous work done 
on the subject of ethnic diversity and civil war has mixed conclusions, with some 
economists finding fragmentation matters while others find that polarization is what truly 
matters. Utilizing multiple variables that cover ethnic data will allow for comparing 
results with a wide array of past works. In order to test the relationship between the 
constitution of a country and its ethnic composition, interaction terms will be created with 
each of the three measures of ethnic diversity. This results in the generation of six new 
variables: MAJFRAG, PRESFRAG; MAJPOLAR, PRESPOLAR; MAJPARTITION, 
PRESPARTITION.  
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 The main variable used to test H2 is the natural resource rents (NRRENTS). The 
natural resource rents variable is source from the World Bank’s, World Development 
Indicators. NRRENTS measures the amount of natural resource rents of a country as a 
percent of GDP. Natural resource rents are the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral, and 
forest rents. There is a wide range of resource rents across the 116 countries, ranging 
from 0 to 47.  
In order to test for H3, this paper will utilize the wheat-sugar ratio 
(WHEATSUGAR). The wheat-sugar ratio is defined as the natural log of 1+share of 
arable land for wheat divided by 1+share of arable land for sugar. This variable measures 
the amount of land suitable for either of those crops, which is used as an instrument for 
both inequality and colonialization. Countries with more land suitable for sugar are more 
unequal and have increased levels of poverty. Colonization could be one of the causes of 
this correlation to inequality and poverty, since European colonists tended to set up 
extractive systems (bad institutions) in warm weather places where sugar is grown more 
than wheat. Again, the range across countries is large, going from -.39 to .577. Another 
measure of inequality used in this study was a GINI index using WIDER data, but since 
the GINI is endogenous the wheat-sugar ratio ends up being a stronger variable for 
inequality.  
In order to have robust results many controls will be used in order. Population 
(POP) will be used to account for the size of the country. Since the range of population 
goes from 15 thousand to over a billion, the natural log of population (LNPOP) will be 
used in order to create a better measure. This data is sourced from Easterly, who used the 
WDI. Another control used in every regression is the population density of the country. 
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POPDEN shows the amount of people per square kilometer. Controlling for population is 
important because larger countries would have shown up as having more civil wars 
simply because the CW variable defines civil wars as a conflict with over 1000 annual 
deaths, a number that is much easier to reach if the country has a large population. 
Another control that is used in every regression is the distance a country is from the 
equator (DISTEQ). This variable was generated by taking the absolute value of a 
countries latitude, with data coming from Dr. Voigt. DISTEQ is used as a geographical 
control, in place of breaking each country down by region or continent.  
Three development controls are included in the data. This includes GDP Per 
Capita (GDPCAPITA), an education index (EDU) and a democracy index (DEM). The 
GDP data comes from Penn World Tables version 6.3, which uses 2005 as the base year 
for real dollars. Education comes from Barro-Lee, while the democracy index is sourced 
from Polity IV. For a complete definition of the democracy variable see “Democracy 
Variable Description” in the appendix. Due to heavy correlation between the three only, 
only GDP per capita is used in most of the regressions as a control.  
The remaining controls used are the age of democracy and a countries openness to 
trade. The age of democracy (DEMYEAR) comes from Dr. Voigt, and shows the year 
that each country became a democracy, i.e. the year they enacted a democratic 
constitution. OPEN, sourced from Easterly, is a measure of how connected a countries 
economy is to the rest of the world, calculated by summing imports and exports then 
dividing that by GDP. Lastly, a measure of individualism (INDIV) and corruption 
(CORRUPTION) was used to control for their effects on the results.  
A complete summary of the data set is provided in the appendix under Table 1. 
33 
 
Methodology  
The following baseline regression will be used to test the relationship between the 
three measures of ethnic diversity (fragmentation, polarization, and partition) and civil 
war: 
CWt,c = B0 + B1ETHNICc + B2LNPOPc,t + B3POPDENc,t + B4DISTEQc +B5NRRENTSc,t 
 In addition to those controls used in the baseline regression above, other controls 
will be used to add robustness to the regressions. These variables include: Age of 
Democracy, GDP Per Capita, Openness, and Wheat Sugar Index. The democracy and 
education variables were dropped from the regressions due to a heavy correlation 
between the GDP variable. Due to this correlation, GDP per capita acts as a 
“development control” within the regressions. Exact correlation results can be found in 
Figure 3 in the appendix. The GINI variable was not used as a control due to its 
endogeneity; the Wheat-Sugar ratio also measures inequality, but is not endogenous. 
In order to test the H1 model, the following baseline regressions will be used:  
CWt,c= B0 + B1ETHNICc + B2MAJc,t + B3PRESc,t + Controlsc,t  
CWt,c= B0 + B1ETHNICc + B2MAJc,t + B3PRESc,t + B4PRESc,t*ETHNICc + 
B5MAJc*ETHNICc + Controlsc,t  
ௗ஼ௐ
ௗ௉ோ
= B1+B4ETHNIC         check if greater or less than 0 
ௗ஼ௐ
ௗெ஺
= B1+B5ETHNIC         check if greater or less than 0 
 
The first of the above baseline regressions will test if a relationship exists between 
ethnic diversity, constitutional structures, and civil war. ETHNIC will include the three 
measures of the ethnic structure of a country: fragmentation, polarization, and partition. 
The second regression includes interaction terms between the constitutional variables and 
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the ethnic variables. If these interaction terms are significant, then the constitutional 
structure of a country can have different impacts on the probability of civil war based on 
different ethnic situations. Likewise, significant results from these variables would imply 
that ethnic composition has different impacts on civil war in varying political 
environment. In a case where the derivative of the interaction term is negative, then the 
combination of that constitutional structure and high ethnic measure results in lower 
likelihood of civil war. If the derivative of the interaction term is positive, the 
constitutional structure combined with high ethnic diversity will increase the chances of 
civil war. For example, if the derivative of the MAJ*POLAR variable shows up positive, 
the combination of a majoritarian system and high ethnic polarization increases the 
incidence of civil conflict.  
H2 will be testing in a similar manor to H1 except with natural resource rents 
replacing the ETHNIC variable. H3 will be tested throughout the models by including the 
wheat-sugar ratio and DISEQ variable, as well as by creating interaction terms with the 
constitution variables and the wheat-sugar ratio.  
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V. Results 
Ethnic Composition 
Tables 2-8, located in the appendix, show the regression results. Table 2 shows 
the baseline regressions for researching the influence of ethnic divisions on civil war. 
Each regression uses one of the three measures of ethnic diversity within one country, 
while controlling for LNPOP, POPDEN, DISTEQ, NRRENTS, and DECADE. 
Regression 1 in Table 2 shows that fragmentation has a positive and significant effect on 
civil war to the 10% level. The coefficient of FRAG in regression 1 is 0.000876, meaning 
that one standard deviation of ethnic fragmentation increases the chance of civil war by 
that amount. Regressions 2 and 3 look at polarization and partition respectively, and 
neither one show a significant relationship with civil war. Fragmentation consistently is 
shown to be positive and significant throughout the results, as expected and supported by 
previous literature.  
Table 3 uses the same three regressions as the baseline model, with additional 
controls for robustness. Additional controls include: GDPCAPITA, OPEN, DEMYEAR, 
and WHEATSUGAR. The controls almost double the R2 value in each regression. 
Interestingly, when adding more controls, the relationship between ethnic fragmentation 
and civil war becomes even more significant and much stronger. The coefficient rose 
from 0.00088 to 0.0011, almost doubling the impact ethnic fragmentation has on civil 
war. This doubling was accompanied by an increase in significance, from the original 
10% level to the 5% level. The polarization and partition variables did not become 
significant by adding more controls. The wheat-sugar ratio shows up as negative and 
highly significant in all three regressions, implying that the legacy of colonialism and 
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extractive institutions might be a more significant indicator for civil war than ethnic 
divisions. 
In order to test the H1 and H2 model, Table 4, runs regressions that show the 
effect of both ethnic fragmentation and constitutional structures on the incidence of civil 
war. All five regressions in Table 4 include FRAG, MAJ, and PRES. Regressions 3, 4 
and 5 include the interaction terms of PRESETHNIC and MAJORETHNIC. Regressions 
2, 4, and 5 include the controls, while all of the regressions utilize the baseline controls. 
Regression 5 is the same as regression 4 except it controls for corruption.  
The results of Table 4 support the idea that ethnic fragmentation is positive and 
significantly impacting civil conflicts, as many economists have found in the past. The 
significance of ethnic fragmentation on civil war varies within the five regressions of 
Table 4, but never only reaches below the 5% level once, in regression 3. The coefficients 
of ethnic fragmentation in Table 4 are even higher than the results of Table 3, indicating 
that ethnic fragmentation matters more when accounting for constitutional structure. The 
coefficients for ethnic fragmentation in these five regressions range from 0.0013 to 
0.0022. Majoritarian governments are found having a negative and significant impact on 
civil war in regressions 1-4, but not to be significant in regression 5, where corruption is 
controlled for. The value of the coefficients of MAJ that are significant average -0.074, 
meaning that a majoritarian system of government reduces the likelihood of civil war by 
that amount.  
This relationship is opposite of what was expected, and could be due to 
majoritarian governments having higher levels of accountability, as previous literature 
suggests. Majoritarian systems have higher accountability than proportional 
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representation because it is easier to determine who is responsible to for specific policies. 
Understanding responsibility allows citizens to vote unfavorable politicians out of office. 
This accountability might lead to higher efficacy, as Persson and Tabellini (2004) 
suggest. The results of Table 4 indicate that the greater efficiency of a majoritarian 
system might outweigh the gains of greater political representation offered in a 
proportional representation system of government. When controlling for corruption 
(regression 5), majoritarian becomes insignificant, and the importance of ethnic 
fragmentation on civil war actually doubles. Regressions 3-5 fail to prove H2, since there 
is no significant relationship between the interaction of governmental structure and high 
ethnic fragmentation. These regressions support the part of H1 that says constitutional 
structure matters, but is opposite of what was expected, with majoritarian governments 
reducing the incidence of civil wars. It is important to note that once again, the wheat-
sugar ratio is showing up as positive and significant in every regression that it is used in.  
 Tables 5 and 6 are similar to Table 4, except use polarization and partition 
respectively as the measure of ethnic diversity. Neither polarization nor partition are 
found to be significant in any of the regressions. While looking at the connection between 
polarization and civil wars, the distance to the equator was negative and significant, but 
only if the wheat-sugar ratio was left out. Once again, the wheat-sugar ratio is found to be 
negative and highly significant (to the 5% level) in all of the regressions it was used in 
Tables 5 and 6. Interestingly, the distance to the equator when looking at partition and 
civil war had the exact opposite effect; DISTEQ in Table 6 was only found to be 
significant when the wheat-sugar ratio was included, and had a positive effect on civil 
war.  
38 
 
 Two results distinctly stand out in Table 6. In the first regression in the table, 
MAJ is both negative and significant to the 5% level, with a value of -0.0345. This is 
consistent with the results of Table 4. In the fourth regression in Table 6, the interaction 
term of a majoritarian government combined with partition is found to be negative and 
significant. These findings are opposite of the H1 prediction that high levels of ethnic 
partition will be less likely to engage in civil war if they institute a proportional system of 
government. Once again, these results support the idea that the greater efficiency of a 
majoritarian systems, and the economic benefits that come with it, offsets the lower 
amount of political power for minority groups.  
Natural Resources 
 Table 7 tests whether or not natural resources impact the incidence of civil war. 
This table looks at the presence of natural resources and constitutional structures, to test 
if the two variables impact the likelihood of civil conflict. The initial hypothesis was that 
a country with high levels of natural resources would be more likely to have a civil war 
under a majoritarian system of government. This hypothesis was drawn on the logic that 
greater representation might allow for more distribution of resource rents, which could 
essentially “buy off” an unhappy segment of the population.  
The results did not support this hypothesis. While higher levels of natural 
resource rents did show up positive in all four regressions, it is only significant in 
regression 3, and only to the 10% level. The coefficient of the significant natural resource 
variable in regression 3 had a value of 0.00356, meaning that higher levels of resources 
increase the incidence of civil conflict. The significance found in regression 3 goes away 
in the 4th regression when the wheat-sugar ratio is included. This hints that natural 
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resources are not directly related to civil wars, but that the wheat-sugar ratio might be a 
better measure for extractive policies. Countries with higher level of extractive 
institutions could be fueling more civil wars than simply the presence of natural 
resources.  
 The interaction between constitutional structures and natural resources causing 
civil war is weak. All 3 regressions with the interaction terms show up as negative 
(opposite of the H3 hypothesis) and only the MAJNRRENTS in regression 3 showed up 
as significant, at the 10% level, with a value of -0.00395. These results indicate that there 
is no definitive connection between natural resources and constitutional structure causing 
civil war.  
Colonial Heritage/Inequality 
The wheat-sugar ratio was included throughout the various regressions in tables 
3-7 as a control, and was consistently shown to be significant. Table 8 attempts to test 
H4, by looking at the interaction of the wheat-sugar ratio with both the majoritarian and 
presidential dummy. Wheat-sugar is positive and significant in two of the four 
regressions in Table 8. In the first regression, the coefficient is -0.079, while in the fourth 
regression the impact of wheat-sugar rises to -0.1. All of the results of the interaction 
terms between the wheat-sugar ratio and constitutional structures show up as 
insignificant. The results of the interaction terms indicate that no significant relationship 
takes place when looking at the connection between the wheat-sugar ratio and 
governmental structures.  
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VI. Concluding Remark 
One of the key findings of this study was that majoritarian systems of government 
lowers the likelihood of civil conflicts. While this was opposite of the initial hypothesis, 
the results can potentially be explained through a lens of accountability. Majoritarian 
systems offer citizens a clearer picture of who is responsible for policy and political 
outcomes. By understanding responsibility, citizens in a democracy can vote a politician 
who doesn’t support their views out of office. Persson and Tabellini (2004) found that 
majoritarian governments were more efficient than proportional systems. This efficiency 
could be a greater benefit to citizens from diverse groups within a country, outweighing 
the cost of having greater political power. Even though Collier and Hoeffler (1998) found 
a connection between polarization and civil war, this paper could not find any significant 
relationship between polarization and internal conflict.   
The paper started with a discussion about Iraq’s failure as a modern state and 
asked the question of whether its constitution didn’t fit with its diverse ethnic structure. 
The results of this paper could not find a strong connection between the interaction of 
ethnic diversity and constitutional structure on civil war. This indicates that you cannot 
tailor a constitution to a country’s ethnic composition. In Iraq’s case, the results of this 
work suggest that the country would not be able to reduce its internal conflict by 
increasing representation, i.e. by changing from majoritarian to proportional 
representation.  
Since the interaction of ethnic composition and constitutions was not found to be 
significant, further study into the incidence of civil wars is definitely needed. Since the 
end of WWII, the vast majority of conflict related deaths have been due to civil conflicts. 
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Replications of this study should be done with different definitions of civil war. This 
paper stuck to the standard definition of 1000 battle deaths annual, which limited the 
amount of countries that had civil war showing up in their data. Understanding the causes 
behind civil wars is the first step in reducing the chances of them occurring in the future. 
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Appendix 
Figure 2:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy Variable Description:  
“Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent 
elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can 
express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third 
is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of 
checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific 
manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil 
liberties. The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The 
operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of 
political participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment (variables 2.3 and 2.2), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4) 
using the following weights” 
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Figure 3: Correlation between GDP per capita, Education, and Democracy 
 
Figure 4: Correlation between ethnic fragmentation, polarization, and partition 
 
Figure 5: Correlation between majoritarian government and corruption 
 
Figure 6: Correlation between corruption and ethnic fragmentation 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  corruption         227    .5877533    .2214509          0          1
                                                                      
        indv         301    44.46512    24.06553          6         91
       majws         275    .0319251     .127682     -.3926      .4833
      presws         275    .0124349    .1413823     -.3314      .5775
 presnrrents         283    2.437482    6.069966          0   43.92686
  majnrrents         283    2.167081    5.660706          0   47.01978
                                                                      
      lnpop2         556    235.0309    63.22897   92.46371   430.1087
    nrrents2         346    80.99364    265.7875          0    2210.86
      disteq         545    26.71422    17.14396        .23      63.89
       lnpop         556    15.18368    2.120129   9.615806   20.73906
majorparti~n         242    7.866116    19.37138          0         99
                                                                      
prespartit~n         242    10.17851    23.69828          0         99
  majorpolar         312     .238404    .3129643          0   .9582003
   prespolar         312    .2132001    .3182882          0   .9546801
 majorethnic         265    20.11698    29.11754          0         90
  presethnic         265     13.9434    24.03045          0         90
                                                                      
  wheatsugar         415    .1214964    .2243008     -.3926      .5775
    latitude         545    18.40963    25.87159     -36.89      63.89
   partition         380    22.81645    26.47622          0         99
        frag         355    36.47887    27.02367          0         90
     demyear         580    1966.198    39.59013       1800       1994
                                                                      
        gini         355    39.99159    10.11538   22.93548       73.9
      popden         554    145.6336    412.4628   .6322125   6011.771
         pop         556    2.37e+07    7.61e+07      15000   1.02e+09
       polar         435    .5222458    .2583295   .0166841   .9582003
        open         432    72.06555    42.51914   7.755843   278.9909
                                                                      
         edu         470    5.889809    3.053427        .08      12.93
         dem         389    5.987147    3.907743          0         10
     nrrents         346    4.847613     7.59348          0   47.01978
   gdpcapita         492     9023.85    8671.695   578.6465   63391.88
         maj         376    .4255319    .4937338          0          1
                                                                      
        pres         376    .3058511    .4613809          0          1
          cw         580    .0313793    .1354892          0          1
      decade         580        1980    14.15434       1960       2000
 countrycode           0
     country           0
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Table 2: Baseline Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES cw cw cw 
frag 0.000876*   
 (1.892)   
polar  -0.0118  
  (-0.266)  
partition   0.000348 
   (0.976) 
lnpop 0.0318*** 0.0270*** 0.0102* 
 (3.827) (4.160) (1.735) 
 popden -2.84e-06 -1.09e-05* -2.37e-06 
 (-0.312) (-1.694) (-0.354) 
disteq -0.00167** -0.00242*** -0.000491 
 (-2.136) (-3.320) (-0.911) 
nrrents -0.000514 -0.000622 0.00179 
 (-0.270) (-0.341) (0.634) 
1980.decade 0.0595* 0.0531* 0.0413 
 (1.652) (1.744) (1.156) 
1990.decade 0.0129 0.0136 -0.0104 
 (0.423) (0.510) (-0.404) 
2000.decade -0.0211 -0.0147 -0.0319* 
 (-0.972) (-0.770) (-1.810) 
Constant -0.449*** -0.316*** -0.125 
 (-3.209) (-3.394) (-1.278) 
    
Observations 261 311 229 
R-squared 0.130 0.108 0.070 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
Table 3: Baseline Regressions Robustness Check 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES cw cw cw 
frag 0.00107**   
 (2.272)   
polar  0.0174  
  (0.318)  
partition   0.000269 
   (0.639) 
lnpop 0.0290** 0.0354*** -0.000806 
 (2.398) (3.041) (-0.0672) 
popden 0.000347*** 0.000102 0.000434** 
 (2.654) (1.092) (2.025) 
disteq 0.00118 0.000746 0.00146 
 (0.865) (0.597) (1.529) 
nrrents 0.00111 0.000370 0.00253 
 (0.472) (0.155) (0.900) 
gdpcapita -2.61e-06 -3.33e-06 -1.98e-06 
 (-0.953) (-1.463) (-0.963) 
open -0.000386 -2.18e-07 -0.000782** 
 (-1.196) (-0.000789) (-2.471) 
demyear 0.000265 0.000136 0.000440** 
 (0.983) (0.560) (2.013) 
wheatsugar -0.207*** -0.197*** -0.182*** 
 (-2.950) (-2.873) (-2.995) 
1980.decade 0.0630* 0.0592* 0.0577 
 (1.653) (1.676) (1.471) 
1990.decade 0.0147 0.0146 -0.00579 
 (0.402) (0.442) (-0.200) 
2000.decade -0.0169 -0.0150 -0.0142 
 (-0.521) (-0.515) (-0.619) 
Constant -0.981* -0.786 -0.818** 
 (-1.759) (-1.545) (-2.177) 
    
Observations 233 260 202 
R-squared 0.208 0.157 0.151 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Ethnic Fragmentation and Constitutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES cw cw cw cw cw 
frag 0.00146*** 0.00158*** 0.00133* 0.00171** 0.00219** 
 (2.767) (2.857) (1.801) (2.193) (2.232) 
maj -0.0776*** -0.0801*** -0.0789** -0.0611* -0.0702 
 (-2.691) (-2.636) (-2.482) (-1.875) (-1.533) 
pres -0.0257 -0.00658 -0.0367 -0.0159 -0.0122 
 (-0.930) (-0.248) (-0.956) (-0.377) (-0.245) 
presethnic   0.000259 0.000221 -0.000179 
   (0.300) (0.250) (-0.152) 
majorethnic   1.64e-05 -0.000511 -0.000296 
   (0.0178) (-0.525) (-0.202) 
lnpop 0.0303*** 0.0318*** 0.0307*** 0.0330*** 0.0223 
 (3.350) (2.672) (3.469) (2.722) (1.201) 
popden 3.22e-06 0.000336*** 2.93e-06 0.000330** 0.000518** 
 (0.367) (2.648) (0.337) (2.552) (2.598) 
disteq -0.00184** 0.00128 -0.00193** 0.00132 0.00177 
 (-2.406) (1.050) (-2.464) (1.037) (0.944) 
nrrents -0.00123 0.000793 -0.00122 0.000816 0.000920 
 (-0.888) (0.426) (-0.866) (0.442) (0.450) 
gdpcapita  -4.87e-06**  -5.12e-06** -4.42e-06 
  (-2.168)  (-2.269) (-1.356) 
open  -0.000215  -0.000179 -0.000297 
  (-0.730)  (-0.596) (-0.629) 
wheatsugar  -0.108**  -0.107** -0.113* 
  (-2.171)  (-2.103) (-1.784) 
1980.decade 0.0746** 0.0752** 0.0749** 0.0746**  
 (2.358) (2.307) (2.368) (2.298)  
1990.decade 0.0417 0.0450 0.0417 0.0455 -0.0248 
 (1.530) (1.433) (1.525) (1.449) (-0.510) 
2000.decade 0.00456 0.0130 0.00463 0.0138 -0.0894* 
 (0.262) (0.452) (0.264) (0.480) (-1.705) 
corruption     -0.0998 
     (-0.782) 
Constant -0.421*** -0.513** -0.419*** -0.533*** -0.256 
 (-2.967) (-2.567) (-3.017) (-2.643) (-0.699) 
      
Observations 211 189 211 189 146 
R-squared 0.164 0.254 0.164 0.256 0.290 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Ethnic Polarization and Constitutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cw cw cw cw 
polar -0.0130 0.0129 -0.0102 0.00157 
 (-0.300) (0.215) (-0.318) (0.0376) 
maj -0.0191 -0.0266 -0.0200 -0.0431 
 (-0.928) (-1.194) (-0.483) (-0.837) 
pres -0.00641 0.0102 -0.000243 0.00310 
 (-0.284) (0.386) (-0.00313) (0.0349) 
prespolar   -0.0108 0.0116 
   (-0.0898) (0.0851) 
majorpolar   0.00109 0.0308 
   (0.0187) (0.397) 
lnpop 0.0243*** 0.0342*** 0.0244*** 0.0343*** 
 (3.350) (2.973) (3.448) (3.033) 
popden -8.85e-06 0.000133 -8.91e-06 0.000139 
 (-1.381) (1.283) (-1.336) (1.350) 
disteq -0.00242*** 0.000914 -0.00242*** 0.000820 
 (-3.081) (0.735) (-3.119) (0.659) 
nrrents -0.00182 -0.000762 -0.00181 -0.000799 
 (-1.449) (-0.429) (-1.404) (-0.452) 
gdpcapita  -4.93e-06**  -4.85e-06** 
  (-2.432)  (-2.371) 
open  0.000118  8.68e-05 
  (0.446)  (0.306) 
wheatsugar  -0.122**  -0.124** 
  (-2.435)  (-2.514) 
1980.decade 0.0736*** 0.0811*** 0.0735*** 0.0817*** 
 (2.670) (2.621) (2.669) (2.672) 
1990.decade 0.0442* 0.0483* 0.0441* 0.0488* 
 (1.780) (1.675) (1.750) (1.656) 
2000.decade 0.0138 0.0174 0.0136 0.0182 
 (0.911) (0.674) (0.889) (0.694) 
Constant -0.285*** -0.525*** -0.288*** -0.518*** 
 (-2.721) (-2.700) (-2.871) (-2.732) 
     
Observations 252 209 252 209 
R-squared 0.116 0.180 0.116 0.180 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Ethnic Partition and Constitutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cw cw cw cw 
partition 0.000475 0.000321 0.000391 0.000326 
 (1.460) (0.841) (1.115) (0.978) 
maj -0.0345** -0.0183 -0.0204 0.00823 
 (-1.993) (-0.976) (-1.347) (0.433) 
pres 0.0183 0.0167 0.00385 0.000909 
 (0.761) (0.785) (0.126) (0.0267) 
majorpartition   -0.000759 -0.00131** 
   (-1.508) (-2.167) 
prespartition   0.000573 0.000699 
   (0.959) (0.916) 
lnpop 0.00721 0.00607 0.00770 0.00640 
 (1.217) (0.562) (1.289) (0.594) 
popden 1.65e-06 0.000305 -1.06e-06 0.000319 
 (0.335) (1.444) (-0.237) (1.447) 
disteq -0.000425 0.00145* -0.000694 0.00141* 
 (-0.858) (1.747) (-1.326) (1.787) 
nrrents -0.000720 -5.50e-05 -0.000770 -7.29e-05 
 (-0.350) (-0.0300) (-0.382) (-0.0407) 
gdpcapita  -3.16e-06*  -4.15e-06** 
  (-1.910)  (-2.200) 
open  -0.000455*  -0.000422* 
  (-1.850)  (-1.721) 
wheatsugar  -0.140**  -0.139** 
  (-2.431)  (-2.322) 
1980.decade 0.0653* 0.0782** 0.0628* 0.0762** 
 (1.830) (2.048) (1.773) (2.042) 
1990.decade 0.0247 0.0304 0.0251 0.0332 
 (1.060) (1.164) (1.089) (1.281) 
2000.decade -0.00284 0.0152 -0.00162 0.0194 
 (-0.308) (1.028) (-0.193) (1.303) 
Constant -0.0984 -0.0923 -0.0947 -0.0882 
 (-1.023) (-0.511) (-1.004) (-0.523) 
     
Observations 184 165 184 165 
R-squared 0.084 0.139 0.092 0.156 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Natural Resources and Civil War 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cw cw cw cw 
nrrents 0.000812 0.00285 0.00356* 0.00227 
 (0.609) (1.429) (1.717) (0.851) 
maj -0.00655 -2.27e-05 0.000864 -0.0273 
 (-0.407) (-0.00122) (0.0452) (-1.184) 
pres 0.0365* 0.0430 0.0214 0.0323 
 (1.725) (1.592) (0.822) (1.166) 
majnrrents  -0.00213 -0.00395* -0.00103 
  (-1.058) (-1.842) (-0.428) 
presnrrents  -0.00205 -0.00363 -0.00444 
  (-0.828) (-1.445) (-1.490) 
lnpop   0.0213*** 0.0321*** 
   (3.307) (3.094) 
popden   1.45e-05* 0.000141 
   (1.907) (1.381) 
gdpcapita   -3.79e-06*** -4.53e-06*** 
   (-3.458) (-2.919) 
disteq    0.000622 
    (0.728) 
wheatsugar    -0.113** 
    (-2.522) 
1980.decade 0.0514** 0.0497* 0.0711*** 0.0774** 
 (1.982) (1.923) (2.655) (2.513) 
1990.decade 0.0349 0.0344 0.0476** 0.0440* 
 (1.553) (1.545) (2.006) (1.689) 
2000.decade 0.00801 0.00740 0.0283** 0.0138 
 (0.718) (0.656) (1.978) (0.779) 
Constant 0.00122 -0.00303 -0.301*** -0.481*** 
 (0.146) (-0.305) (-3.123) (-2.922) 
     
Observations 283 283 282 221 
R-squared 0.037 0.038 0.138 0.184 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Wheat-Sugar Ratio and Civil War 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES cw cw cw cw 
wheatsugar -0.0791*** -0.0570 -0.0737 -0.102* 
 (-2.746) (-1.366) (-1.498) (-1.937) 
maj 5.77e-05 0.00632 -0.0260 -0.0171 
 (0.00340) (0.286) (-1.153) (-0.727) 
pres 0.0289 0.0337 0.00762 0.0157 
 (1.408) (1.370) (0.295) (0.675) 
majws  -0.0417 -0.0573 -0.0435 
  (-0.740) (-0.782) (-0.557) 
presws  -0.0165 0.0594 0.0206 
  (-0.270) (0.890) (0.315) 
lnpop   0.0299*** 0.0272*** 
   (3.203) (2.810) 
popden   0.000121 0.000143 
   (1.236) (1.425) 
gdpcapita   -4.05e-06*** -4.25e-06*** 
   (-3.443) (-3.048) 
disteq    0.000775 
    (1.107) 
1970.decade 0.00623 0.00622 0.0118 0.0138 
 (0.943) (0.921) (0.958) (1.163) 
1980.decade 0.0731** 0.0733** 0.0804** 0.0840*** 
 (2.424) (2.415) (2.545) (2.696) 
1990.decade 0.0489** 0.0485** 0.0538** 0.0537** 
 (2.249) (2.210) (2.240) (2.124) 
2000.decade 0.0212 0.0208 0.0271 0.0262 
 (1.567) (1.531) (1.584) (1.372) 
Constant 0.00585 0.000775 -0.434*** -0.420*** 
 (0.593) (0.0536) (-3.165) (-2.722) 
     
Observations 275 275 264 255 
R-squared 0.057 0.058 0.175 0.169 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
